This paper investigates whether multinational firms are inefficient in innovation and whether efficient innovation can mitigate the valuation discount of global diversification. Using patents or citations scaled by R&D expenses and R&D capital as the measures for innovation efficiency, we find that multinational firms have lower levels of innovation efficiency than purely domestic firms, and innovation inefficiency could partially explain the negative valuation effect of global diversification.
INTRODUCTION
The internalization theory predicts that the geographic boundaries of firms are determined by the costs and benefits of internalizing markets for their intangible assets such as managing and marketing skills, patents, technological know-how, goodwill and brand recognition, etc. 1 According to the theory, multinational enterprises set up subsidiaries to exploit their advantages in informationrelated intangible assets as these assets have public good properties and are difficult to be exchanged in external markets. This implies that, when firms possess substantial information-based assets, global diversification should create more value for shareholders due to the increased scale over which such intangible assets are applied. However, the literature documents a significant value discount associated with global diversification with a few exceptions. 2 To explain why geographically diversified firms are worth less than their geographically concentrated counterparts, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) provide an agency problem-based explanation. Geographic expansions can arise from agency problems as such activities, while might not be value maximizing to shareholders, provide monetary and nonmonetary incentives to management. This paper attempts to interpret the valuation effect of global diversification from another perspective -inefficient corporate innovation of multinational firms. Specifically, we explore whether multinational firms are less efficient in innovation and whether efficient R&D expenditures can mitigate the negative valuation effect associated with global diversification.
We define innovation efficiency as patents or patent citations scaled by either R&D expenses or R&D capital. 3 In other words, the innovation efficiency measures firms' ability to generate patents and patent citations for every unit of investment in R&D. The results show that multinational firms are less efficient in innovation than purely domestic firms. For example, globally diversified firms have much more investment in R&D expenditure than their domestic counterparts ($47.7 million v.s. $12.1 million). However, the Crd and Prd ratios for globally diversified firms are 6.78 and 0.45 which are significantly lower than 8.26 and 0.51 for domestic firms. The multivariate analysis with various controls that are documented to have an impact on corporate innovation provide consistent results. We also find that industrial diversification reduces innovation efficiency but does not subsume the negative effect of global diversification on corporate innovation efficiency. To confirm our findings, we further examine how the change of global diversification status is related to subsequent innovation efficiency and find that innovation efficiency decreases when firms become globally diversified and vice versa.
Next, we study how corporate innovation efficiency affects firm value for multinational firms by interacting global diversification with innovation efficiency measures. Specifically, we examine whether globally diversified firms exhibit less value discount if they are more efficient in innovation.
Overall, we find that improvements in innovation efficiency are associated with significant increases in firm value for average firms. Globally diversified firms can particularly gain more benefit from being efficient in innovation, though global diversification per se still has negative effect on firm value. Thus, the negative valuation impact of global diversification has been reduced significantly if innovation efficiency improves. For example, we find that, for an increase of one standard deviation in innovation efficiency measures-Crd or Prd, the value discount associated with global diversification will reduce by 12.5% or 32.2%, respectively. This piece of evidence suggests that the discount in firm value associated with global diversification partly stems from inefficient investments or inefficient allocation of corporate resources.
Finally, we investigate the valuation effect of innovation efficiency for multinational firms in various business environments such as product market competition, the extent of economy development, and the strength of patent protections. We find that firms with greater innovation efficiency tend to have better firm valuation if they operate in concentrated industries rather than competitive industries. This can be interpreted as that firms appropriate more rents from their innovations by going international if their business environment is not very competitive. We further find that multinational firms gain more benefit from improving innovation efficiency if they diversify into developed markets or markets with better patent protections as such kind of countries usually have better governance quality and better protections on intellectual property which enable patents to create more value for firms.
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our empirical evidence that links innovation inefficiency directly to multinational firms expands the understanding on the valuation impact of global diversification. Denis, Denis, and Yost (2012) attribute the value discount associated with global diversification to the cost of agency problem. We demonstrate that globally diversified firms are inefficient in innovation which could potentially contribute to the negative valuation effect of global diversification. s which is related to inefficient investments and resource allocation. Second, our explanation for the negative valuation effect of geographic diversification is in align with the arguments of the theoretical studies that diversification discount could arise from sub-optimal investment decisions in diversified firms (Raja, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) ). This is also consistent with the empirical findings for industrially diversified firms (Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) ). Finally, we extend the recent literature that attempts to find out how product market competition and patent protection affect innovation.
Schumpeter (1942) contends that large firms in concentrated industries drive the innovation while Arrow (1962) firms in competitive industries have a stronger incentive to innovate. Aghion and Howitt (1992) assert that patent protection is good for innovation and competition is detrimental to innovation. In contrast, Boldrin and Levin (2002) demonstrate that patent protection actually hurts innovation and competition stimulates firms to innovate. We introduce another dimension to show the potential impacts of competition and patent protection on innovation -the valuation effect of innovation. We find that innovation efficiency adds more value to multinational firms in concentrated industries and in countries with better patent protections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and presents the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables employed in the empirical tests as well as summarizes their statistics. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 evaluates the impacts of innovation efficiency under various business environments. The final section concludes.
MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Recent studies find that globally diversified firms have high levels of R&D expenses than purely domestic firms and that diversification decisions are driven by the innovation (see, e.g., Morck and Yeung, 1991; Rodriguez-Duarte et al., 2007) . If innovation is positively associated with a firm's long term performance (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001; Penman and Zhang, 2002; Lev, Sarath, and Sougiannis, 2005; Pandit, Wasley, and Zach, 2011) , globally diversified firms are supposed to have better performance even though global diversification does not necessarily add value to firms. However, empirical evidence shows that globally diversified firms are valued at a discount. That is, multinational firms have lower firm value than their counterpart domestic firms (Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002) . This casts some doubts about whether the innovation is less efficient in multinational firms.
There are several reasons that multinational firms may be less efficient in innovation. First, the organization structures are generally more complex in multinational firms. Multinational firms usually have R&D centers in several locations in order to take the advantage of low-cost inputs (Morck and Young, 1991) . This can lead to high costs of cooperation among R&D centers and monitoring in the progress of R&D projects, resulting in reduced innovation performance at firm level (Harris, Kreibel, and Raviv, 1982; Bodnar, Tang, and Weintrop, 1999) . Moreover, some big multinational firms can even own operations in over a hundred countries. Since each segment has its own culture and characteristics, the probability that a unit hides its own private information to protect itself or for benefits is increased and this increases the asymmetric information between each unit and the headquarters. As a result, resources in a firm are not allocated as efficient as investors expect. For example, Harris and Raviv (1982) demonstrate that firms allocate resources among divisions based on the transfer prices. This resource allocation method can minimize costs but is not efficient because the division which needs the resources most may not have the highest priority. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) document that each division in a firm can influence the resource distribution. When divisions have different levels of incentives, resources are allocated through negotiations and funds may actually flow from the best divisions to divisions with few opportunities causing sub-optimal allocation of corporate resources and less profitable investments.
Second, even though resources are allocated efficiently in a firm, multinational firms still face some more difficulties than domestic firms when engineering similar products. For example, varying cultures, political, economic and legal systems, regulations and languages require multinational firms to pour a great amount of resources into R&D to meet the demand of local people from different countries. One example is that the electronic devices need to offer users an option to change display languages, to adjust the user interface, to change the look and feel, and to add/remove some functions corresponding to local needs. Therefore, globally diversified firms will face a steeper learning curve than purely domestic firms to design a product although the products deliver a similar function. This is because when firms innovate, firms have to consider all possible situations that they may encounter in their target markets and the innovation for multinational firms becomes more complex, difficult and time-consuming.
Lastly, barriers to market entry and weak copyright protection in the global market can prevent multinational firms from innovating efficiently. Unless foreign goods are significantly superior to local products at the same price level, consumers will tend to purchase local products because of the ease to access customer service and the familiarity to the local firms. However, due to the principle of diminishing marginal productivity, more resources put into R&D do not necessarily guarantee increased quality of innovation. Weak copyright protection and trade protection in the global market further make the innovation less efficient for globally diversified firms. To protect intellectual property, globally diversified firms need to invest extra money and time on R&D to stop piracy. Local governments also can implement different levels of regulations on foreign products.
After multinational firms resolve all the regulatory issues, local firms have provided alternatives to the foreign products. Thus, firms cannot merely focus on innovation and resources are usually not optimally utilized. Based upon the above discussion, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis: Ceteris paribus, multinational firms are inefficient in innovation than domestic firms.
We further argue that the inefficient innovation of multinational firms may be one of the reasons that globally diversified firms are valued at a discount. As Hirshleifer, Hsu and Li (2012) document, information related to new technologies or innovations are difficult to process for investors due to high uncertainty and lack of appropriate evaluation method. Therefore, there is a positive relation between innovation efficiency and future stock performance because firms with higher levels of innovation efficiency has been undervalued by investors relative to inefficient firms. Since multinational firms are more complex (Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002), we expect that innovation inefficiency will be discounted more for globally diversified firms than purely domestic firms. Or, in another way, improved innovation efficiency will mitigate the negative impact of international diversification on firm value. Therefore, we develop the hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis: Higher innovation efficiency reduces the negative impact of international diversification on firm valuation.
In the innovation literature, business environment affect firms innovation. Among all environmental factors, product market competition and patent protection are two widely discussed topics.
Some researchers argue that competition hurts innovation. Some other researchers think that competition can stimulate firms to innovate. For example, Schumpeter (1942) contends that firm size and industry matter for innovation. In his theory, large firms in concentrated industries are the main force to innovate. Arrow (1962) argues that incentive to innovate for firms is stronger in competitive industries. Aghion and Howitt (1992) assert that competition reduces firms' motive to innovate but patent protection is good for innovation. Contrast to Aghion and Howitt, Boldrin and Levin (2002) demonstrate that patent protection is detrimental to innovation; however, competition provides a mechanism to force firm managers to innovate.
To investigate the effect of innovation efficiency on firm value for multinational firms while considering for business environments, we focus on product market competition at the firm level, and patent protection and market efficiency at the country level. The economic literature offers two possible explanations to show how product market competition may reduce agency costs and improve investment efficiency. First, Hart (1983) demonstrates that competition among firms can provide investors more accurate information. With more information available, managers have less discretion to hide their private information and to gain private benefits (Holmstrom, 1982; Hermalin, 1992) . Second, competition raises the probability of liquidation that motivates managers to improve their performance in order to avoid losing their job (Schmidt, 1997) . The fear of this liquidation creates incentive for firm managers to innovate (Allen and Gale, 2000) . Since product market competition has provided information and disciplinary force, managers of multinational firms are not able to exploit rents for their benefits and they have to strive to improve operating efficiency in order to survive. Thus, innovation efficiency may add little value to multinational firms in competitive industries. However, efficient innovation becomes important for multinational firms to reduce diversification discount in concentrated industries due to fewer information sources and lack of disciplinary force on firm managers.
Aghion, Howitt, and Prantl (2013) document that the incentive to innovate for firms depends on the net innovation rent which is the difference between post-innovation rent and pre-innovation rent. Although product market competition reduces pre-innovation rent as well as post-innovation rent, the amount that the pre-innovation rent will be reduced is more than the reduction of postinnovation rent. Therefore, the net innovation rent in competitive industries is still large enough to stimulate firms to innovate but not enough for firm managers to exploit the rent for their private benefits. In the concentrated industries, firms can decide their price to maintain their revenue.
Since the pre-innovation rent is high and firms do not need to be aggressive on innovation, innovation efficiency may not be valued for investors in the concentrated industries. Therefore, we develop the hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis: Innovation efficiency matters more for multinational firms in concentrated industries than in competitive industries.
Hypothesis: Innovation efficiency is valued more in competitive industries than in concentrated industries.
Market and country characteristics are also important for foreign trades, especially intangible assets. Among all market characteristics, we are interested in developed and emerging markets because the definition of developed and emerging markets is clear and communicative. In addition, this classification is widely used in academia and practice. Fan, Wei, and Xu (2011) argue that firms in emerging markets are structurally different from firms in developed markets. Emerging markets also feature poor government quality, weak law enforcement, high state ownership, poor financial market development and weak patent protection. Although entering emerging markets could provide diversification benefits for U.S. multinational firms, it is still not clear whether investing in emerging markets benefit intellectual assets based and R&D intensive multinational firms due to high entry cost, weak copyright protection, inefficient government and weak law enforcement.
As document before, the incentive to innovate for firms depends on the net innovation rent.
We predict that efficient innovation creates more value in well-developed countries. This is because patent protection on innovation increases the post-innovation rent and this creates incentive for firms to innovate (see, Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Aghion, Howitt, and Prantl, 2013) . In addition, well-developed countries have lower costs to enter and fewer barriers for foreign investors. This reduces the pre-innovation rent and increase the net innovation rent for multinational firms in developed countries. We expect that the net innovation rent is greater in developed than emerging markets. Therefore, we formalize them in terms of the following testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Innovation efficiency matters more for multinational firms in countries which are developed markets and provide stronger patent protection.
DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

Information on Innovation Efficiency
Our sample consists of firms in the intersection of the NBER patent database and Compustat 2), we start the sample in 1980 which allows for a full five-year period with reliable R&D expenditure data for computing R&D capital. We choose 2003 as the last year for the patent data because patent counts toward the end of the NBER patent database are subject to truncation bias as it takes on average two years from the time a patent is applied for to the time it is granted (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001 ).
output. Patent counts for a firm each year are the number of patent applications filed that year that were eventually granted. Patent citations are the total number of citations a firm receives in the subsequent years on all the patents it produces in a year. Citations are adjusted for the truncation bias using the approach suggested by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) . 
Missing R&D has been set to zero in computing innovative efficiency measures. We scale innovative outputs by cumulative R&D expenses is premised on R&D expenses over the preceding five years all contributing to successful patent applications filed in year t (Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li, 2012) .
Information on Diversification
We augment patenting firms with all the firms listed on Compustat segment files that operate in the same 4-digit SIC industries as the patenting firms but who do not have patents. We take the patent count to be zero for these firms (Seru, 2011)). We further impose some requirements on the merged sample. Specifically, we exclude utility and financial firms (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999, respectively) and firms with any industrial segment in utility or financial industries. We also exclude firm-years in which the consolidated firm sales are less than $20 million and firm-years in which the total of either industrial or geographic segment sales is not within one percent of total consolidated firm sales for that year. Following Berger and Ofek (1995) and Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002), we exclude outliers that are defined as those observations for which the firm's actual value is either more than four times its imputed value or less than one-fourth its imputed value. Imputed value of a diversified firm is the sum of the segment values, with each segment valued using median sales multipliers of single-segment firms in that industry. 5 The industry definitions are based on the narrowest SIC grouping that includes at least five firms. Our selection procedure results in a sample of 36,718 firm-years associated with 6,625 firms.
The definition of global diversification is based on Compustat geographic segment files. A firm is defined as globally diversified if it reports any sales by foreign subsidiaries. Firm excess value is measured as the log of the ratio of the firm's actual value to its imputed value. We also consider a list of firm characteristics that are documented to affect firm investment or firm valuation. Tobin's q is measured as market valuation over book assets where market valuation is computed as the sum of book assets and market value of common shares minus common equity and deferred taxes. Institutional ownership data are obtained from SEC 13F filings compiled by Thomson Reuters. Firm age is the number of years a firm is listed on CRSP. R&D intensity is proxied by RD sale which is defined as R&D expenditure scaled by sales. Debt is long-term debt and notes payable over total assets. Capex sale is capital expenditure scaled by sales. Advex sale is advertising expenditure over sales. Firm profitability is measured by EBIT sale, i.e., operating income after depreciation plus nonoperating income deflated by sales. Cashfl is income before 5 We also use median assets multiplier and the results are qualitatively the same. extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization deflated by total assets. The extent of industry competition is proxied by Herfindahl index which is computed at the level of 3-digit SIC code. Forecast error serves as a measure of information environment surrounding a firm and it is constructed using the earnings forecast information from I/B/E/S. Specifically, it is computed as the absolute value of the ratio of the difference between median earnings forecast and actual earnings per share over actual earnings per share. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the innovation efficiency measures, excess value measure, and control variables used in the regression analyses later. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. In Panel A, both the full sample and patenting firms are classified along whether they are globally diversified. T-test is performed on the difference between globally diversified and non-globally diversified firms. Results shows that, compared to non-globally diversified firms, globally diversified firms exhibit less innovation efficiency and the relation holds for all the four efficiency measures. For example, the difference in Pat RD (Cite RD) is 0.053 (1.482) between non-globally diversified and globally diversified firms and it is statistically significant at 1%. Globally diversified firms have greater excess value than non-globally diversified firms, which is different from the existing findings that global diversification is associated with value discount. However, most of the control variables exhibit significant difference between globally diversified firms and their counterparts and thus the univariate results may not be very informative. For example, globally diversified firms tend to have more institutional ownership, more R&D expenditure, less debt, less capital expenditure and more advertising expense. Also, they are older, larger, and more profitable. Patenting firms show similiar patterns as well except that the contrast between globally diversified firms and non-globally diversified firms is even remarkable.
Descriptive Statistics
Panel B further controls for industrial diversification. Basically, it shows that, regardless of the industrial diversification status, globally diversified firms are significantly less innovation efficient than their counterparts though they have significantly more R&D expenditure. Table 2 presents the correlations among all these variables. In general, the four measures of innovation efficiency are highly correlated with each other but they are not highly correlated with other firm characteristics. The correlation coefficient between any two of them ranges from 0.749 to 0.966. The various innovation efficiency measures are positively correlated with firm excess value, capital expenditure, profitability and cash flows and negatively correlated with institutional ownership, firm size, and R&D expenditure.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Previous studies document a valuation discount for global and industrial diversifications. For example, Christophe (1997) and Denis, Denis, and Yost (2012) find that multinational firms are valued at a discount than purely domestic firms. Denis, Denis, and Yost (2012) further attribute this fact to the cost of agency problem. However, as Harris and Raviv (1982) , and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) demonstrate that diversified firm are inefficient in resource allocation and investment decisions. Thus, we conjecture that multinational firms are less efficient in innovation and this could be one of factors that cause a lower firm value for globally diversified firms than purely domestic firms.
In the following subsection, we test whether multinational firms are inefficient in innovation.
Then, we explore whether increases in innovation efficiency could mitigate the negative effect of global diversification on firm value.
Innovation Efficiency and Global Diversification
We use the following Tobit regression model to compare innovation efficiency across firms with global and industrial diversifications versus average purely domestic firms:
where IE measures are Crd, Crdc, Prd, and Prdc. Crd and Crdc are adjusted citations over R&D expenditure and R&D capital (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001 See Data section for a detailed descriptions of these variables. Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (2) As argued in the previous studies, global diversification is driven by innovation (see, e.g., Morck
and Yeung, 1991). Therefore, our findings may be biased because domestic firms do not innovate and spend less in R&D. In the right Panel of Table 3 , we only include patenting firms in the sample and rerun our regressions to see whether there is any change to our findings. Although global diversification is still negatively associated with innovation efficiency, the significance of coefficients reduces when depend variables are Prd and Prdc. However, they are still significant at the 10% level. In unreported tables, we implement OLS regressions to test the relation between innovation efficiency and global diversification and find the coefficient estimates of global diversification are significant at all conventional levels across all innovation efficiency measures. Since the number of patents during a year for firms is generally limited in a range and does not vary too much, it is more reasonable to use the Tobit regressions to estimate coefficients. To be conservative to our conclusions, we list Tobit regression results in the Table 3 .
It is interesting to note that older firms are generally efficient in innovation, but institutional ownership is negatively related to innovation efficiency. Thus, experience matters for innovation efficiency because knowledge and know-how can be cumulative and can be used to shorten learn curve when firms involve in innovation. However, our findings seem to be inconsistent with Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2009) . In their study, they find that firms with higher institutional ownership have a stronger incentive to innovate. One possible explanation is that institutional investors tend to invest in big firms (see, e.g., Gompers and Metrick, 2001 ) and this causes the negative relation between institutional ownership and innovation efficiency. In our sample, we find that multinational firms tend to be big in size. Furthermore, there is a negative correlation between firm size (proxied with sales) and innovation efficiency measures. The institutional ownership is very likely to be negatively associated with innovation efficiency. Firm value (Q) and operating performance (EBIT) are in general positively related to innovation efficiency except when using Similar results also can be found when only using patenting firms. This indicates that more capital invested in R&D does not necessarily guarantee better innovation performance.
Switching Global Diversification Status and Change of Innovation Efficiency
We further examine whether changes in global diversification status are associated with changes in innovation efficiency. It is possible that the choice of global diversification may be endogenously determined as firms with inefficient investment may go global in order to maximize its benefits from intangible assets (Mork and Yeung, 1991) . To address this issue, we conduct three different tests and report the results in Table 4 .
In the first test, we exploit the effect of changes in global diversification status on subsequent changes in innovation efficiency for subsample which includes all event firms. We define the change of global diversification status between year t-1 and t. Then, we measure the change of innovation efficiency between year t-1 and t+3, and between year t-1 and t+5 to test how innovation efficiency 
Innovation Efficiency, Global Diversification and Firm Value
In this subsection, we investigate the relation between innovation efficiency and firm value and test whether this relation can mitigate the effect of valuation discount for global diversification if innovation efficiency is positively related to firm value. Specifically, we test the following model:
where EV is the excess firm value defined in the Data section; GblDiv and IndDiv are dimmy vari- value. However, leverage reduces firm value and advertising expenditure has no significant relation with firm value. We also exclude innovation efficiency measures from the regression and find that the relation between global diversification and firm value is still significant and negative (unreported results).
We next assess the assumption that increases in innovation efficiency for multinational corporations mitigate the diversification discount. In the Panel B of Table 5 , global diversification dummy is interacted with innovation efficiency measures. Results show that the coefficients on the interaction term between global diversification dummy (GblDiv) and innovation efficiency measures (IE) are all significantly positive at 1% level. This indicates that multinational firms with higher innovation efficiency will experience a smaller diversification discount. Although coefficients of interaction term between GblDiv and IE across models are not large compared to the coefficients of GblDiv, they are economically significant. Using equation (3) and focusing on the global diversification discount, we can get:
Therefore, the global diversification discount is the coefficient of GblDiv plus the coefficient of GblDiv× IE times IE measures. 6 To see how change of innovation efficiency affects global diversification discount, we can rewrite the equation as: In summary, the findings from Table 3 , Table 4 and Table 5 are consistent with our hypotheses that multinational firms are inefficient in innovation and improving innovation efficiency can mitigate the diversification discount for multinational firms. Thus, inefficient innovation could be one of important factors that cause a valuation discount for globally diversification.
INNOVATION EFFICIENCY, GLOBAL DIVERSIFICATION AND MARKETS
In the innovation literature, product market competition and patent protection are two widely discussed topics. Some researchers argue that competition hurts innovation (Schumpeter, 1942) .
Some other researchers think that firms' incentive to innovate is stronger in competitive industries than in concentrated industries (Arrow, 1962) . Aghion and Howitt (1992) assert that product market competition impedes firms from innovating but patent protection stimulates innovation.
Boldrin and Levin (2002) demonstrate that patent protection is detrimental to innovation but competition provides a mechanism to force firm managers to innovate.
In the following subsections, we first investigate how the efficient innovation could reduce the diversification discount regarding product market competition. Then, we explore whether multinational firms with high levels of innovation efficiency could benefit from well-developed economy and patent protection for their investments.
Product Market Competition and Innovation Efficiency
In this subsection, we separate industries into high competition industries (competitive industries) and low competition industries (concentrated industries) to explore how the valuation effect of innovation efficiency for multinational firms varies with product market conditions. Specifically, we separately evaluate equation (3) for firms in competitive industries and in concentrated industries. Table 6 reports the estimation results.
We find that global diversified firms are negatively associated with firm value in both competitive and concentrated industries. Thus, even though product market competition provides disciplinary force on the firm management, it still could not eliminate global diversification discount. We further find that the coefficients on the interaction term between global diversification Table are generally positive across all models but none of these coefficients is significant.
We also find that some factors consistently show the same effect on firm value in both competitive and concentrated industries. For example, large firm size, higher R&D expenditures, smaller debt ratio, higher operating income and higher capital expenditures are associated with higher firm value no matter in competitive industries or in concentrated industries. Therefore, the analysis in Table 6 finds that innovation efficiency has different valuation effects on multinational firms pertaining to the product market competition. Specifically, the diversification discount will be smaller for efficient multinational firms in concentrated industries but not in competitive industries. However, we also find that innovation efficiency increases with firm value for average firms in competitive industries but not in concentrated industries.
Patent Protection and Market Development
In this subsection, we first partition countries into two groups according to market development and patent protection. Thus, countries are categorized as developed versus emerging markets, and strong patent protection (more protection) versus weak patent protection (less protection). When using patent protection to classify countries, countries having patent protection score above or equal to the median are categorized as 'strong protection' countries; otherwise, 'weak protection' DCA contains business profiles and geographic distribution of subsidiaries and allows us to identify the proportion of foreign subsidiaries in developed markets and in strong patent protection countries for each globally diversified firm. We then estimate equation (3) for each subgroup of firms. Table   7 and Table 8 report results by classifying firms using market development and patent protection, respectively.
The results in Table 7 indicate that increases in innovation efficiency are related to higher firm value when multinational firms have most investments in developed markets. The coefficients on IE in the left Panel are 0.002, 0.005, 0.032, and 0.091 across four models and are statistically significant at conventional levels. However, the coefficient estimates of IE are all insignificant in emerging markets. Thus, market development matters for multinational firms. When they invest more in developed markets, the diversification discount will be smaller if they also improve their innovation efficiency. We further find that there is a discount associated with industrial diversification in both developed and emerging markets. The discount seems to be smaller for multinational firms in developed markets. Consistent with our previous findings, firm size and R&D expenditure have a positive effect on the firm value. EBIT becomes insignificant in emerging market and capital expenditure is no longer significant in developed market. Table 8 reports the test of our hypothesis that global diversified firms gain more value in countries with stronger patent protection. We find that multinational firms with higher levels of innovation efficiency have better firm performance in countries with stronger patent protection.
All the coefficients on IE are statistically significant in the left Panel of the Table 8 . Although innovation efficiency is also positively associated with firm value, the coefficients on IE are smaller in countries with weak patent protection than in countries with strong patent protection. Thus, patent protection is important for innovative multinational firms, especially for globally diversified firms with higher innovation efficiency. We note, however, that our investigation is subject to some limitations because innovation efficiency does not equal to innovation that commonly documented in the literature.
In summary, our analyses in this section show some important findings. First, multinational firms with higher innovation efficiency have a smaller diversification discount in concentrated industries but not in competitive industries. Second, product market competition matters for firms with higher levels of innovation efficiency and efficient firms perform better in competitive industries.
Third, market development and stronger patent protection play a key role on improving firm value for multinational firms with higher innovation efficiency. The overall findings indicate that product market competition stimulates innovation and at the same time also discipline executives in firms.
This is because competition reduces both pre-and post-innovation rents and leaves enough net innovation rent for firms to engage in innovation. However, the rent is not large enough for firm managers to exploit for their private benefits. In addition, competition has provided disciplinary force on firm managers. If they do not work hard, they will be removed from their position. Welldeveloped countries have lower pre-innovation rent and higher post-innovation rent. This will offer greater incentive for firms to innovate because they will gain profit from their innovation (due to higher net innovation rent). In the emerging markets, the entry costs are high and the patent protection is weak. Since the net innovation rent is small, efficient innovation will not be valued in emerging market. Our last finding provide evidence to innovation literature that patent protection is important for multinational firms which are more efficient in innovation.
CONCLUSION
Previous studies find that multinational firms are valued at a discount than domestic firms. The cost of agency problem and inefficient resource allocation are two of possible explanations for this valuation discount of global diversification. As literature documents, multinational firms have a complex organization structure and the resource allocation is not efficient within the firm. We conjecture that global diversified firms may be inefficient in innovation which leads to lower firm value.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between innovation efficiency and global diversification and the valuation effect of innovation efficiency on multinational firms.
We find that multinational firms have lower levels of innovation efficiency than purely domestic firms. For example, multinational firms invest 7.7% of their sales in R&D but the ratio of patents to R&D expenses is only 0.454 while domestic firms investing 7.8% of sales in R&D with 0.507 for the innovation efficiency ratio. Thus, domestic firms are more efficient in innovation. Results are still consistent even after controlling for variables that are previously shown to affect innovation efficiency or firm investments. We also find that industrial diversification is associated with inefficient innovation; however, the negative effect of global diversification on innovation efficiency is still significant at conventional levels when we control the industrial diversification effect in the regressions. To make sure our findings are robust, we examine how change of global diversification status is related to subsequent innovation efficiency. Results indicate that firms become inefficient in innovation when they switch their status from domestic firms to multinational firms and tend to be more efficient when they change from multinational firms to domestic firms. We further find that efficient innovation is related to higher firm value. When multinational firms are efficient in innovation, their valuation discount will be smaller than average globally diversified firms. The discount effect of global diversification seems to, in part, stem from inefficient corporate investment decisions.
In the innovation literature, product market competition and patent protection are widely discussed. Some researchers argue that competition and patent protection could foster innovation.
However, some other researchers disagree with such an argument. Therefore, we explore how the effect of innovation efficiency on firm value for multinational firms varies with several business envi-
ronments. Further analyses demonstrate that efficient firms have better firm value than inefficient firms in competitive industries. However, multinational firms only gain additional benefits from being efficient in innovation in concentrated industries. We further find that multinational firms have better performance when they have more subsidiaries located in countries which are developed markets and have stronger patent protections. Globally (industrially) diversified firms are firms with sales from foreign subsidiaries (more than one business segment) in a given year. Crd is adjusted citations over R&D expenditure and Crdc is adjusted citations over R&D capital. Prd is patent counts divided by R&D expenditure. Prdc is patent counts over R&D capital. R&D capital is defined as the weighted average of R&D expenditures over the last five years with an annual depreciation rate of 20%. EV is the excess value of a firm measured as the log of the ratio of firm's actual value to its imputed value. IO is the percentage of institutional ownership. Age is the number of years a firm listed on CRSP return files. Sales, RD, and RDc are sales, R&D expenditure, and R&D capital in millions of dollars. Q is Tobin's q measured as market valuation over book assets. RDs is R&D expenditure deflated by sales. Lev is long-term debt and notes payable over total assets. CapEx, Adv and EBIT are capital expenditure, advertising expenditure, and operating income after depreciation plus nonoperating income scaled by sales. CF is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization deflated by total assets. Herf is Herfindahl index computed at the level of 3-digit SIC code. Sample period is from 1980 to 2003. *** , **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Table 2 Correlation Coefficients This table reports Table 3 Effect of International Diversification on Innovation Efficiency
This table shows the relationship between international diversification and firms' efficiency of R&D expenditures proxied by various IE measures. The dependent variables are IE measures which include adjusted citations/R&D expenditure (Crd), adjusted citations/R&D capital (Crdc), the number of patents/R&D expenditure (Prd), and the number of patents/R&D capital (Prdc). GblDiv (IndDiv) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is a globally (industrially) diversified firm and 0 if otherwise. The control variables include the percentage of institutional ownership (IO), firm age (Age), log of sales (Ln(Sales)), firm value (Q), log of R&D capital (Ln(RDc)), debt ratio (Lev), earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), capital expenditure (CapEx), advertising expenditure (Adv), and cash flow (CF). Lev is the ratio of long-term debt and notes payable to total assets. EBIT, CapEx, and Adv are operating income after depreciation plus nonoperating income, capital expenditure, and advertising expenditure divided by sales, respectively. CF is income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization deflated by total assets. All regressions include unreported industry-and year-fixed effects. Table 7 . All globally diversified firms are classified into strong and weak patent protections based on the weighted average of patent protection score of the countries where foreign subsidiaries reside. Patent protection score is obtained from Ginarte and Park (1997) . Firms are grouped as strong patent protection if the weighted average of patent protection score for a firm's foreign subsidiaries is higher than or equal to the median of globally diversified firms; otherwise, the firm is classified as weak patent protection. 
